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LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN ENGLAND AFTER THE
RESTORATION
Some little time ago I was talking to an eminent historian who
was lamenting that the English lawyers who had interested them-selves in the history and development of legal ideas and legal procedure in this country.had, mostly, set a limit for their investigations at about the time of the Civil War, whereas, said he, it

would be most important for historians to have the process completed up to modern times. He said that no one had taken the
trouble to investigate what kind of matters chiefly came before
the courts after the Restoration, how they were dealt with, or
how the legal ideas governing the decisions of the courts developed
from that date. I acknowledged the justice of the criticism, and
during part of the Long Vacation I amused myself by going through
the reports of Sir T. Raymond and Levinz, which are the King's
Bench Reports from the Restoration to the end of the reign of
William and Mary, and making an analysis of the subjects with
which the various decisions dealt.'
IThe following is, roughly, the result:
64 cases dealt with criminal or quasi-criminal matters; 26 with technical
,questions on error; i9 with mandamus; 45 with prohibition; 5 wich certiorari; r
(353)
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There are about twelve hundred decisions in all, and the first
thing that is noticeable about the list is the comparative dearth
of actions in relation to commercial matters. It is not that such
matters are ignored. On the contrary, almost every kind of com-mercial transaction is incidentally referred to somewhere.
Woodward v. Bonithan, Sir T. R. 3, is an application for
a prohibition to the Court of Admiralty, to restrain them
from dealing with an action upon an agreement for the hire
of a ship, on the ground that the agreement was made on
land.
Graves v. Sawcer, Sir T. R. 15, is an action by one part
owner of a ship against another for fraudulently selling herabroad.
Eliot v. Blake, Sir T. R. 65, is an action in which a question is raised as to the exception of "perils of the sea" in a
contract for the sale and delivery of goods.
Mors v. Slue, Sir T. R. 220, is an action on the casewith habeas corpus; i with ouo warranto; 14 with scire facias; 4 with qui lam; I
with latitat; i with auditaquerela; 6 with duty of sheriff; 12 with escape; 3 withrescue; i with hue and cry; i with sureties; 21 with bail; 4 with forcible entry;
2 with contempt of court; 5 with outlawry; 4o with questions of pleading; 16 with
questions as to trial of actions; 2 with form of writs; 2 with evidence; i with writ
of inquiry; 3 with execution and process; i with attachment; 6 with abatement;
3 with damages; 2 with wager of law; 5 with questions about jurors; 5 with.
bankruptcy; 2 with satisfaction of judgmcnts; 2 with costs; 2 with accord and.
satisfaction; 2 with estoppel; 4 with release; 7 with privilege from arrest; I with
privilege of Parliament; 4 with assize for office; 2 with Courts of Honour; 7 witl.
customs and bye-laws of towns; 2 with charitable trusts; i with apprenticeship;:
i with extortion by jailor; i with constitutional law; i with revenue; 2 with royal
grants and charters; i with poor law; 6 with ecclesiastical law; 3 with husband and
wife; i with jointure; io with dower; 8 with infancy; 32 with actions on awards;
95 with ejectment; 29 with replevin; 2 with wrongful distress; 32 with rent; 30.
with manors and copyholds; 8 with tithes; 36 with trespass to land; 5o with covenants relating to land; x8 with devises bf land; 4 with attornment; 20 with cases
relating to estates in land; i with parcels; 4 with formedon; 2 with partition of
lands; 2 with prescription as to lands; 3 with nuisance; r with ancient lights; 3
with ways; I with watercourses; 3 with highways; 3 with waste; i with common,
recovery; 8 with statutes of limitation; 3 with use and occupation; 62 with debt;.
55 with assumpsit (except in cases otherwise' specified); 2 with account; 4 with,
conditions in bond; 22 with cases connected with shipping (charter-party, bottomry, etc.); 7 with actions on wagers; 6 with sale of goods; 5 with marriage
brocage; 2 with breach of promise of marriage; 2 with bills of exchange; 2 with
quantum meruit; 25 with trover; 66 with slander; i with libel; 18 with trespass to
goods; 19 with trespass to person; 41 with trespass on the case (for matters other
than those specified); 2 with personal negligence; i with deceit; and 49 with ac-tions by and against executors.
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against the master of a general ship for goods stolen when
on board.
Mustard v. Harnden, Sir T. R. 39o, is an action for
damages for negligence causing a collision in the River
Thames.
Hugks v. Cornelius, Sir T. R. 473, is an action of trover
for a ship condemned as a prize. Question as to whether
judgment of a foreign prize court is final.
Sands v. Exton, Sir T. R. 488. Prohibition to the Admiralty Court in reference to the arrest of a ship sailing to
the East Indies contrary to the East India Company's
charter.
Sayer v. Glean, i Lev. 54. Action on bottomry bill.
Collins v. Sutton, 1 Lev. 149. Action on bottomry
bond.
Stone v. Waddington, i Lev. 156. Action for goods
sold and delivered.
Anon., i Lev. 166. Assumpsit for price of goods sold
and delivered.
Hussy v. Pacy, i Lev. 188. Action for breach of covenant not to import certain goods.
Jurado v. Gregory, i Lev. 267. Prohibition to the Admiralty with reference to a contract at Malaga to load goods
there.
Brown v. London, I Lev. 298. Assumpsit on the custom of merchants by drawer against acceptor of a bill of
exchange.
Martin v. Delboe, i Lev. 298. Statutes of limitation
not pleadable on accounts stated between merchants.
Watton v. Weddington, 2 Lev. 7. Action on bottomry
bond.
Ridly v. Egglesfield, 2 Lev. 25. Case for suing in the
Admiralty in respect of ship taken by pirates.
Bolton v. Lee, 2 Lev. 56. Covenant -upon a charter
party.
Cooker v. Child, !, Lev. 74. Debt upon an indenture
of charter party.
Rea v. Barnes, 2 Lev. 117. Debt upon a charter party.
Burdet v. Thrule, 2 Lev. 126. Action for account by
merchant against factor.
Fowk v. Pinsacke, 2 Lev. 153. Assumpsit for premium
on policy of marine insurance.
Hall v. Huffam, 2 Lev. 188, 228. Assumpsit for price
of goods sold.
Cole v. Shallet, 3 Lev. 41. Covenant on charter party.
Coke v. Cretchet, 3 Lev. 60. Prohibition to stay suit in
Admiralty for mariner's wages.
Boson v. Sandford, 3 Lev. 258. Case against the proprietors of a general ship for damage to cargo.
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Kempe v. Andrews, 3 Lev. 291. Trover for ship affreightment.
Horton v. Coggs, 3 Lev. 296. Case on the custom of
London, to pay note payable to bearer.
Keech v. Knight, 3 Lev. 315. Assumpsit on sale of a
vessel.
Jeffery v. Legender, 3 Lev. 320. Assumpsit on a policy
of marine insurance.
These thirty cases are the only cases in all this period in which
commercial matters are dealt with at all-in many of them only
incidentally. They serve to shew, however, that the commercial
community was alive, was chartering and insuring ships, selling
goods at home and abroad, dealing in bills of exchange and the like,
much as their successors have done. There must have been thousands of such transactions. How comes it that they occupied the
attention of the King's Courts so little? It is often said that there
was practically no commercial law before the time of Lord Mansfield, and that it was his ordering and exposition of that law which
2
induced suitors to come into the Courts.
I doubt very much if this is the true explanation. Contracts
very similar to the modern contracts of affreightment, insurance,
negotiable instruments, etc., and the well known meicantile rules
applying to them, had been known and must, have been constantly
acted upon amongst merchants for a thousand years. When we
do get a glimpse of such transactions, during the period in question,
they do not assume any questionable shape, but are spoken of by
the Law Reporters as if everyone understood them. After all,
I In his well known judgment in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63 (1786)
Buller, J., says:
"We find in Snee v. Prescott that Lord Hardwicke himself was proceeding
with great caution, not establishing any general principle, but decreeing on all the
circumstances of the case put together. Before that period we find that in courts
of law all the evidence in mercantila cases was thrown together; they were left
generally to a jury, and they produced no established principle. From that time,
we all know the great study has been to find some certain general principles,
which shall be known to all mankind, not only to rule th-. particular case under
consideration, but to serve as a guide for the future. Most of us have heard
these prindiples stated, reasoned upon, enlarged and explained, till we have been
lost in admiration at the strength and stretch of the human understanding.
And I should be very sorry to find myself under a necessity of differing from any
case on this subject which has been decided by Lord Mansfield, who may be truly
-said to be the founder of the commercial law of this country."
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Lord Mansfield's work was mainly equivalent to a .codification of
mercantile rules which had been understood and acted upon for
centuries. Litigants do not, as a rule, care whether they are establishing a precedent or not. A mercantile jury is by no means
a bad tribunal for deciding a mercantile case, and one would have
thought that the more the law was systematized and reduced to
rules quotable as precedents, the less litigation there would beOtherwise codification of the law is of very doubtful utility.
I cannot help fancying that the true reason for the lack of
commercial cases in the Supreme Court must have been that the
merchants found that they could get their disputes settled elsewhere much more expeditiously and cheaply, and without the risk
of defeat upon technicalities or the necessity of submitting to antediluvian forms of trial, which were the curses of the High Court.
In the first place, it is evident frok the large number of cases of
error from and prohibition to the local Courts of Record that those
Courts enjoyed a popularity which has long since waned. It
would be interesting to examine the records of the Tolsey Court
at Bristo!, for instance, if they exist, and find out what class of
cases were then being dealt with, and what number of them. The
local courts must have been much less expensive than the High
Court and much more speedy; and the suitors possessed in the old
practice of foreign attachmenta, a means of compelling the submission to the jurisdiction of the Court and of obtaining the fruits
-of their judgments, which the High Court did not possess. At
any rate it is evident from the reports of Raymond and Levinz
that these local Courts were much more active in their time than
they afterward became.
Secondly, it is noticeable that during the period in question
there are no less than thirty-two decisions upon matters arising
out of arbitrations. This is a very large proportion. We are accustomed to think and say, today, that commercial business has
deserted the Law Courts in favor of arbitration. I fancy that in
the period with which we are dealing this must have been even more
the case.
The next point that calls for attention in the list is that, although there are no less than 66 actions for slander, there is only
3 See Mayor of London v. Cox, (1866) L. R.

2

H. L. 239.
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one single case of libel. I imagine that, at this date, libel was
practically always dealt with as a criminal and not as a civil matter. 4
4 This question as to how and when the High Court in England came to
deal with actions for defamation is rather perplexing. Under the Statutes
Circumspecte Agatis (1285, 13 Edw. I) and Articuli Cleri (1315-1316, 9 Edw. II)

jurisdiction in cases of defamation is clearly reserved to the Ecclesiastical Courts.
Nevertheless, at a very early date, the local Manorial Courts seem to have entertained suits for defamation, sometimes as' a penal, and sometimes as a civil
matter (Holdsworth, Vol. II, pp. 319 etseq.). But, as far as present research
has gone, all the cases dealt with seem to have been for oral defamation, or slander.
At some period which is uncertain, but which is generally supposed to date
rom the weakening of the Ecclesiastical Courts from the Reformation, the
King's Courts accepted jurisdiction to deal with oral defamation. The Ecclesiastical Courts continued, however, for centuries, to retain a jurisdiction to
deal with cases of defamation which were not actionable at Common Law, as
for mere abuse, calling a woman "a whore" and the like, and the books are full
of cases where prohibition was applied for to prevent them from exceeding their
jurisdiction in this respect. At any rate, from the beginning of the Elizabethan
Reports, Coke, Croke, Yelverton, etc., the Law Reports are full of cases of slander,
mostly of the most trumpery description. At about the same time the Star
Chamber seems to have undertaken to deal with cases of libel, but solely from a
penal point of view.
Actions for libel in the High Courts, however, are practically non-existent.
I have searched both King's Bench and Common Bench Reports from Elizabethan times down to the end of Modern Reports, which takes us well into the
reign of George the Second. In all that period, though there are several cases
referring to indictments, informations or penal bills for libel in the King's Courts
or the Star Chamber, I have found only three cases of civil actions for libel, viz.,
Eyres v. Sedgewicke, Cro. Jac. 6oi (18 Jac. I); Lake v. King, i Lev. 139 (20 Car.
II); and an Anonymous Case, II Mod. 99 (5 Anne). It is noticeable that the
first of these cases was for making a false affidavit in Chancery by reason of which
the plaintiff was imprisoned; and the second was for presenting a false petition
to Parliament accusing the plaintiff of malversation in his office of Vicar-General.
The last of the three cases alone was an ordinary straightforward libel of the
modern kind. During all this period the books are full of cases of oral defamation.
This is not altogether easy of explanation. It seems plain that the King's
Courts had jurisdiction to try ordinary cases: of libel. In the case of Peacock v.
Reynal (IO Jac. I, 1612), reported in 2 Brownlow & Goldsborough 152, which
appears to be a report of proceedings in the Str Chamber, after stating the nature
of the libel alleged in the bill of the plaintiff exhibited in the Star Chamber, the
report proceeds: "And it was agreed that this was a libel, and for that the Defendant was fined to £200 and imprisonment according to the course of the court,
and the Plaintifflet loose to the common law for his recompensefor the damages he
hath sustained."
It is probable that in some cases a cause of action which we should now call
an action for libel was wrapped up in an action on the case of a rather indefinite
character. See the cases of Sheppard v. Wakeman, i Lev. 53,and Coxe v. Smithie, i
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Actions for personal negligence amount to only two, and for
deceit to only one. I see no way of accounting for this deficiency.
It presents a curious contrast to modern cause lists, and one would
have thought that men must have been careless and untruthful at
-this date as well as later. Actions for work and labor are also very
-scarce. Three hundred and fifty-nine cases, or more than a fourth
of the whole number, relate to questions arising out of the ownership of land; though it is noticeable that only eight of these have
reference to nuisances or incorporeal hereditaments. The great
.majority were questions as to the effect of various forms of limitation of estates.
Two matters are worthy of notice to those who are interested
in the development of legal ideas, viz., (i) the manner in which
lawyers were feeling their way to a clear idea of what amounted to
-a wrong for which an action on the case would lie, and (2) the gradual working out of the doctrine of assumpsit, including the idea
'of consideration as a necessary element in contractual relations:
i. Maliciously setting the law in motion.
(a) Criminally.
Low v. Beardmore, Sir T. R. 135. Action on the case
against the defendant for falsely and maliciously indicting
the plaintiff for a rescous; and on not guilty found for the
plaintiff, Powis, for the defendant, moved in arrest of judgment, that such an action on the case doth not lie for indicting one for a bare trespass, and this indictment was but
a trespass. The Court seem to have come to no conclusion,
but the point was evidently not considered settled, a case
being quoted in the Exchequer Chamber against the plaintiff.
Henley v. Burstal, Sir T. R. 18o. Action upon the case
for maliciously indicting the plaintiff, being a justice of the
peace, for delivering a vagrant out of custody, without examination, contrary to law. Upon not guilty pleaded, a verdict
found for the plaintiff; and Swain moved for the defendant
in arrest of judgment, that such action doth not lie, because
Lev. 119, set out post at pp. 363-4, and, indeed, the two cases of Eyres v. Sedgewicke
-and Lake v. King, supra, in which the damage resulting from the libel is stated
as the gravamen of the case rather than the libel itself. Nevertheless even these
cases are so rare that I cannot help thinking that, as a rule, libel was dealt with
.as a criminal and not as a civil matter. It is noticeable, in this connection, that
in the well known report of Coke, The Cas de Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. R. 125 a
(3 Jac. I), there is no suggestion that a libel could give rise to anything but a
penal proceeding.
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it deters a man from prosecuting for the King. Maynard
Serjeant for the plaintiff. Where the indictment is preferred maliciously, and such indictment contains matter of
imputation and slander as well as crime; there the action
lies; but otherwise where the indictment contains crime
without slander, as forcible entry, etc., -but here is slander
as well as crime; and of that opinion was all the Court; and
judgment was given for the plaintiff.
(b) In the Ecclesiastical Court.
Gray v. Day, Sir T. R. 408. An action upon the case.
The plaintiff declares, that he being church-warden of such
a parish, and having given an account at the end of his year
to his successor, and the parishioners; the defendant falsely
and maliciously cited him into the Ecclesiastical Court to
render an account, and there at the defendant's request
the Judge excommunicated the plaintiff for not rendering
the account. Upon not guilty pleaded, and verdict for the
plaintiff, Saunders moved in arrest of judgment, because the
sentence was given by the Judge, and so he and the Court
were to blame, and not the defendant. But resolved the
action lies; and judgment was given for the plaintiff.
Hoskins v. Matthews, I Lev. 292. Case, for that the
defendant falsely and maliciously, without any reasonable
cause, cited and excommunicated him in the Ecclesiastical
Court. After verdict, it was moved in arrest of judgment,
that it does not appear for what cause the suit there was.
But per Cur', it is said and found to be falsly, and without
any cause; and the action lies, and judgment was for the
plaintiff.
(c) Malicious Civil Proceedings.
Stribler v. Jones, i Lev. 275. Case, and declares, that
the defendant falsly and maliciously devising to dampnify
him, and to hinder him from going about his affairs, sued a
latitat against him out of the King's Bench in trespass, with
ac etiam assumpsit for 500 1. -and caused him to be arrested
and imprisoned for such a time, whereas in truth he had not
any cause of action, vel saltem non tantum causam actionis..
After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of
judgment, that it is not positively said, that he had not cause
of action; but none, or at least Wot so great; and it is not so
great if it fails but of Is. of so much. But the Court to the
contrary, it is found to be done maliciously, wherefore
judgment was ruled for the plaintiff.
Webster v. Haigh, 3 Lev. 210. Case for that the defendant wickedly intending and maliciously contriving
ipsum minus rite praegravare, & tam per corporis imprisonament' quam alias labores & expensas, praetextujustitiae &
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legis processus defatigare opprimere & depauperare & multipliciter praegravare & damnificare ex malitia sua praehabit'
tali die & loco, virtute cujusdam brevis de quo minus e Cur',
Scaccar' sine aliqua rationabilicausa arrestari& imprisonari
subdole fraudulenter & injuste causavit, & in prisona detineri

procuravit, until he gave a warrant of attorney to confess
a judgment for 201. in the King's Bench, Common Pleas,
or Exchequer, whereby he had and suffered damages to 40 1.
To this the defendant demurred generally; and now it was
argued for the defendant, that no action lies for suing in a
proper Court; for a man may mistake his own case, and think
he has a good cause of action where it proves otherwise;
and here the declaration does not say, that he knowing he had
no cause of action sued .......
.But for the plaintiff it

was argued, that the action lies as it is laid here; for it is
said, the action was brought ex malitia praehabita, & sine
aliqua causa rationabili ipsum damnificare, which implies

the knowing he had no cause of action; and this is confessed
by the demurrer .......
.And here Charlton held totisviribus, that the action did not lie because the law had provided another remedy, viz., costs. But Jones Chief-Justice
and Just. Street held, that the action lay for the unjust,
causeless, and malicious vexation premeditated, all which
are confessed by the demurrer. Levinz doubted, because
it is not expressly said, knowing he had no cause of action;

but he inclined, that the action lay, because the defendant
had compelled the now plaintiff to give him a judgment for
20 1. whereby he is deprived of his remedy by costs, etc.
But it was adjourned.
It will be noticed that in these cases the law is in a state of
fluidity. It is apparently not settled either what, constitutes the
cause of action, or for what reason. But very shortly afterwards,
in the case of Savile v. Roberts, in the Exchequer Chamber, i Lord
Raymond 374 (9Win. III), the judgment of Holt, C. J., lays down
the law very nearly in accordance with modern ideas. In that
case the declaration was drawn (omitting verbiage) substantially
in the modern form, and alleges all that it would be necessary to
allege in a similar case at the present day, viz., that Savile
"imachinanset nequiter et malitiose intendens ipsum Jacobum
(Roberts) minus rite praegravare etc. .......
sine causa
rationabili, ex malitia sua praecogitata apud Barnesley in
comitatu praedicto apud generalem quarterialem sessionem
pacis coram etc.......
.. de eo quod ipsi secundo die
Octobris anno regni domini Willelmi tertii Dei gratia nunc
regis Angliae, &c. septimo, vi et armis apud Beneby prae-
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dictam in le West Riding comitatus praedicti riotose routose
illicite et injuste sese assemblaverunt et congregaverunt etc.
. . falso indictari malitiose fecit et procuravit, ac indictamentum illud versus ipsum Jacobum Roberts falso et malitiose
prosecutus fuit et prosecutum esse causavit, quousque idem
.debito modo secundum
JacobusRoberts postea etc.......
legem et consuetudinem hujus regni Angliae inde acquietatus
Quorum quidem praemissorum praetextu idem
fuit. ......
Jacobus Roberts non solum in bonis nomine fama credentia et
aestimatione suis praedictis quibus praeantea gavisus fuerit
magnoperelaesus ac in diversis negotiis licitiset honestis agendis
multipliciter impeditus existit, verum etiam idem Jacobus
valde graves et arduos labores subire et diversus denariorum
summas pro acquietatione sua praedicta et ejus exoneratione
in hac parte expendere et erogare coactus et compulsus fuit,
ad damnum ipsius Jacobi Roberts viginti librarum etc."
I have set the material passages of this declaration out at
length because it shews such a surprisingly sudden advance from the
inchoate, tentative, and jerky declarations in the cases previously
cited, and, in fact, is just in the form in which a similar cause of
action would be alleged in England in the present day. All the
necessary ingredients are stated, viz., that Savile falsely and maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause presented and
prosecuted an indictment against Roberts, that Roberts was acquitted and suffered damage, in reputation and in pocket. As
the earliest of the cases previously cited was in 17 Car. 11 (1667)
and the latest in i Jac. 11 (1685) and the case of Savile v. Roberts
was in 9 Win. III (1702), the advance in legal conception by the
pleader is remarkable, especially as the law was still quite uncertain. In the case of Savile v. Roberts there was a verdict for the
plaintiff; defendant then moved in arrest of judgment and the case
was argued two or three times at the bar of the Court of Common
Pleas, and then there was a division of opinion in the Court, Nevill
and Powell, JJ., holding that the action would well lie, but Treby,
C. J., being of the contrary opinion. Whereupon the case was taken
on error to the Exchequer Chamber, where the Court, under the
guidance of Holt, C. J., were unanimous in favor of the plaintiff,
Holt, C. J_, saying:
"that this point is no primae impressionis, but that it has
been much unsettled in Westminster-Hall, and therefore to
set it at rest is at this time very necessary. "
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He then proceeds to expound the law, to a great extent as
it would be laid down at the present time, and draws the distinction between a malicious criminal prosecution and malicious civil
proceedings very much as was subsequently decided by the Court
-of Appeal in The Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre,
(1883) II Q. B. D. 674, in which the judgment of Holt, C. J., is
,quoted as the standard pronouncement on the subject.
2. Malicious Injury to Reputation.
Mason v. Jennings, Sir T. R. 4oi. In a special action
upon the case. The plaintiff declares, that he is a hackneycoachman, and that the defendant with an intent to disgrace him did ride Skimmington.
In Cropp v. Tilney, 3 Salk. 225, Holt, C. J., who is not often
taught tripping, says:
"as for instance, an action was brought by the husband
for riding Skimmington, and adjudged that it lay, because
it made him ridiculous, and exposed him,"
and he gives it as an example that in an action for libel it is sufficient that the alleged libel should make a man ridiculous. And
this is quoted in all the text-books to the present day, ignoring the
fact that in at least two cases "riding Skimmington" had been
held not to be actionable. How such a proceeding could be a
libel it is difficult to see, and as no special damage was alleged it
would not be actionable as a slander.
3. Miscellaneous Ations for Damage Arising from False
Statements.
Sheppard v. Wakernan, i Lev. 53 (14 Car. II). Case,
where the plaintiff was to be married to such a one who
intended to take her to his wife; the defendant falsly and
maliciously to hinder the marriage, writ a letter to the said
person, that the plaintiff was contracted to him, whereby
she lost her marriage. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was
moved, that the action did not lie, the defendant claiming
title to her himself, like as Gerrard'scase, 4 Co. for slander
of title. But after divers motions, the plaintiff had judgment, for it was found to be malicious and false; and if such
an action should not lie, a mean and base person might injure any person of honour and fortune by such a pretence.
'For "riding Skimmington"
lines 560-712.

see Butler's "Hudibras," Part II, Canto II,
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Coxe v. Smith, i Lev. ii9 (15 Car. II).

Case for that

he being an officer of the Custom-House, the defendant
made a false affidavit against him in Chancery, touching
malfeasance in his office; and afterwards petitioned the
commissioners of the Customs against him, and thereupon
caused him to be turned out of his place: after a verdict
(upon not guilty) for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest
of judgment, that no action lies for the making of a false
oath, Owen 258. 2 Cro. 6oi. Hutt. ii. Poph. 144. 1
Leon. 107, and that no action lies for the petition, because
it is done in a course of justice. But (said) by the Court.
The action is not founded on the oath, nor on the petition,
but those are only inducements to prove the malicious procurement to have him turned out of his place: and that it
was falsely and maliciously done, is now found by the verdict;
and they gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Ekins v. Tresham, i Lev. lO2 (15 Car. II).

Case, that

whereas the plaintiff and defendant were in treaty for the
sale of a messuage; the defendant falsly and fraudulently
affirmed it was let at 42 1. per annum; whereto the plaintiff'
gave faith, gave him 500 1. for it, where in truth it was let
at 32 1. per annum only. After verdict for the plaintiff,.
it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the action did not
lie; as for saying that a thing is of a greater value than it is,
without warranty no action lies, Yelv. 20. No more will it
for saying that it is demised for more than in truth it is; for
the party might inform himself from the tenant, and a
warranty will not bind a man in a thing that is apparent;
as to warrant that a horse has both his eyes, when he is
apparently blind of one of them. But by the Court, tho'
an action will not lie for saying, that a thing is of greater
value than it is (nor by Wyndham, it is perjury to swear it,.
because value consists in judgment and estimation, wherein
men many times differ). Yet to affirm that a thing is demised for more than it is, is a falsity in his own knowledge,
and the party who is deceived, may for such deceit have an
action, for perhaps the lease is by parol, or the tenant will
not inform the purchaser what rent he gave. And after
it had been twice moved, judgment was given for the plaintiff in Trinity, 15 Car. II, by the whole Court.
Cooper v.

Witham, i Lev. 247 (20 Car. II).

Case

against the husband and wife, for that she being covert,
affirmed herself to be sole, and requested the plaintiff to
marry her, and lays it to be done maliciously, with intent
to deceive him; whereupon he married her, whereby he was
disturbed in conscience, and put to great charge by the
husband. After a verdict for the plaintiff on (the issue)
not guilty, it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the
action does not lie; for the wife cannot by any contract or
agreement charge the husband, and if he should be charged
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here, it would be by the wife's contract with the plaintiff
to marry him; but for trespass or words she might charge
the husband, for that she may do without assent of the husband or any other; and if damage ensue thereupon, it ought
to be recompensed by some body, and no other can do that
but the husband. But this marriage could not be made
without the assent and contract of the plaintiff (himself) and
therefore it shall not charge the husband, and so held the
Court, and gave judgment for the defendant: they also said,
that this was felony in the wife, and Twysden said, that an
action did not lie for the master for beating of his servant
to death, for that he lost his service; for the party ought to
be indicted for it, as is Yelv. 9 o . But see Latch 144, M1arkham against Cobb, Style 346, 347. Dawes against Coveneigh, that trespass lies for a felonious taking money after
the party has been convicted and burnt in the hand: also
it was here said, that the wife had been pardoned of the felony,
but that did not appear upon the record; and if she had, yet
the fact sounding in contract, it seems that the action does
not lie.
The first two ot these cases present a curiously hybrid appearance. At the present day they would take the foim of actions
for libel, simpliciter, if they disclosed any cause of action at all.
As in fact framed, they are a kind of hybrid between an action for
libel and an action for a wrongful procuring of an act to be done by
another by means of a false statement. The two latter cases are
cases of deceit, practically in the modern form, and shewing that the
Courts already appreciated the distinction between an actual false
representation and a mere puffing of wares or property.
4. Actions upon the Case against a Public Official for Breach
of a Public Duty.

Starling v. Turner, 2 Lev. 5o

(24

Car. II).

Case, and

declares that by the custom of London, the bridge-master
is chose by plurality of voices of the freemen, and that if
the electors are so divided, that the majority cannot be
known by the view, that the mayor ought to grant a poll;
and that Starling being mayor, where upon the election the
majority could not be known, refused to grant a poll to
Turner, a candidate at that election, by which he lost the
office. After verdict and judgment for Turner, plaintiff in
the Common Pleas, error was brought in B. R. and assigned
for error, that the action lies not, because it is not shown that
he had been elected if a poll had been granted. Sed non
allocatur. For the mayor did not do his duty, and 'tis said
by that he lost the office, which after verdict is sufficient;
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and of that opinion were all the judges of the Common Pleas,
but Vaughan Chief Justice. Note, It was not a question in
either of the two Courts, whether an action of the case would
lie, for the bare denying or refusing of a poll, and returning
another? But this seemd to be admitted by both Courts.
Herring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250 (31 Car. II). Case;
whereas the plaintiff was a freeman, and had a voice in the
election of mayors, the defendant the present mayor refused
to receive his vote; and now upon issue and trial the plaintiff
was nonsuit, but the roll not marked for double costs. And
now the defendant moved to have double costs, which was
opposed, because it does not appear whether the plaintiff
was nonsuit for want of proof that the defendant was the
present mayor. 2. The statute gives double costs where the
officer is sued for matter done by him in doing his office, and
this suit is for non fezans in his office. Cur'. This case is
not within the intent of the statute; the scope whereof was,
that whereas mayors, &c., were sued for false imprisonment,
or such matters, wherein they ought to justify that they
may plead the general issue, and shall have double costs, but
not in such cases as this.
The actual point reported in this case is not of importance
except that it is interesting to see how far back the protection to
public officials extends. But in his famous judgment in Ashby v.
White, Ld. Raym. 938 (2 Anne), Lord Holt, C. J., says of this case"So in the case of Herringv. Finch nobody scrupled but
that the action well lay, for the plaintiff was thereby deprived of his right."
Bernardiston v. Some, 2 Lev. 114 (26 Car. II). Case,
and declares that a writ issued out of Chancery to the defendant, then Sheriff of Suffolk, to elect a knight of the county
for the Parliament, and that the plaintiff was chosen by the
majority of freeholders, and that the defendant returned
the writ with an indenture of the said election, but maliciously intending to deprive the plaintiff, de fiducia & praed'
falso & deceptive, una cum indentura praed' retornavit unam
alteram indenturam in Cancellaria praed' specificant' quod
aliae personae liberi tenentes vel major pars liberorum tenentium elegerunt quendem Lionelluh Tolmach, ubi revera praed'
Lionellus non fuit electus per majorem numerum liberorum
tenentium, ratione cujus the plaintiff was kept out of the
House of Commons, and put to great charge to prove his
election in the House of Commons. The defendant pleaded
non culp. and upon trial at Bar, Twysden Rainsford and
Wylde held, and so directed the jury, that if this double
return was made maliciously, they ought to find for the
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plaintiff, which accordingly they did, and gave him 8oo 1.
damages, though the evidence as to the malice and falsity
was very slender.
.....
.And
now it was moved in
arrest of judgment by North Attorney General, and Scroggs
King's Serjeant, that this action lies not, . . . First,
Because the falsity or verity of the return is only examinable in the House of Commons, who are the sole judges, and
will punish such falsities, and accordingly they have so
done in this case, by committing the Sheriff. . . . Secondly,
The right of the party is not considerable in this case
for this is not an office of profit, but of trust concerning the
State. Thirdly, What the Sheriff does in this case, he doth
as a judge; for he is a judge of the election, and therefore
no action lies against him. Fourthly, .......
the
sheriff hath done no more in this case than laid the matter
before the House of Commons, that the validity of the votes
may be there deliberately examined. To which it was
answered by Maynard, King's Serjeant, and Sir William
Jones, Solicitor. First, That here was malice and falsity in
the Sheriff, and thereby damage and charge to the plaintiff,
and all this was found by the jury, which is sufficient to
mantain an action in all cases, whether there has been a
like action in such case or no before; for actions upon the
case are founded upon the particular case, which is mostly
new. . . . Secondly, The commitment by the Parliament
is only to punish the contempt of the sheriff as to them
and the State, but not to repair the party for the damage
he sustained. . . . Thirdly, The sheriff is not a judge of
the election in this case, but a minister to take the polls, of
which in point of sufficiency the House of Commons is judge.
Et adjournatur ad proximum terminum, when Hale
F
being in Court, he, Twysden and Wylde, for as much as the
return is said to be falso & malitiose & ea intentione to put
the plaintiff to charge and -expence, and so found by the
jury, held the action lay, and gave judgment for the plaintiff,
Rainsford doubting; upon this a writ of error was brought
in the Exchequer-Chamber, where, by North Chief Justice,
and five other Judges against two, the judgment was
re6
versed upon the matter in law, that the action lies not.
This batch of cases is interesting as shewing that, even at
this period, the courts had practically arrived at the conclusion,
afterwards categorically affirmed in the well known case of Ashby
v. White, supra, that an action on the case lay for the bare infringe6 It would have been interesting to see the judgment in this case in the Exchequer Chamber, but in the only report that I can find of it, Pollexfen 470, only
the judgment of one of the Judges in the minority is given.
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ment of a positive legal right, even where no damage in fact could
be established-ubi jus ubi remedium. It is perhaps, however,
worth observing that the pleaders had apparently not yet made
up their minds exactly as to what the cause of action was, as, even
in the case of Ashby v. White, it was alleged that the defendants,
"contriving, and fraudulently and maliciously intending
to damnify him, the said Matthias Ashby, in this behalf,"
did then and there hinder him, the said Matthias Ashby, etc.
They seem to have thought that it was necessary to allege and prove
that the act of the defendant had been done maliciously and dishonestly, as in the case of malicious prosecution-whereas, in fact,
such allegation was wholly immaterial, except possibly in the case
7
of the double return.
5. Actions upon the Case against Private Persons for Breach
of a Duty arising from a Contractual Relation.
Mors v. Slue, Sir T. R. 220, I Vent. 190, 238 (24 & 25
Car. II). (The pleading is taken from the report in Ventris.)
An action upon the case was brought by the plaintiff against
the defendant; and he declared, that whereas according to
the law and custom of England, masters and governors of
ships which go from London beyond sea and take upon them
to carry goods beyond sea, are bound to keep safely day and
night the same goods, without loss or subtraction, ita quod
pro defectu of them, they may not come to any damage; and
whereas the Ith of May last, the defendant was master
of a certain ship called "The William and John," then riding
at the port of London, and the plaintiff had caused to be
laden on board her three trunks, and therein 40o pairs of
silk stockings, and 174 pounds of silk, by him to be transported for a reasonable reward of freight to be paid, and he
then and there did receive them, and ought to have transported them, &c., but he did so negligently keep them, that
in default of sufficient care and custody of him and his servants, the same were totally lost out of the said ship.
7 I suspect that there may have been another reason for this. It was a
rule of the old procedure that "in no case where a contempt, deceit, trespass, or
injury is supposed in the defendant, shall he wage his law." Bac. Abr.: Wager
of Law, p. 35o, quoting i Inst. 295 a. Now one of the great objects of pleaders
in old days-was to avoid framing a case in such a way that the defendant could
wag, his law. It may be that when they invented the new formula of trespass
on the case, they garnished their pleading with these irrelevant expletives in
order to make sure that under the new form of action the defendant should not
be allowed to wage his law.

"; Y- -T"- -

.' V:

' --"

Tz°

--'-Z

-

-

-

U

""
-

- ;v ,'

-" ' Y--;-

'

-

'- ,:

LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN ENGLAND AFTER RESTORATION 369

Upon not guilty pleaded, the juiy found a special
verdict, viz. that the defendant was master of a ship which
lay in the river of Thames, near St. Katherine's, that the plaintiff delivered goods to him to transport. That the defendant received his salary from the owner of the ship; that there
being three men and a boy in the said ship, persons unknown,
about eleven o'clock in the n ght came on board with a pretended warrant to search for felons, and seized upon the
persons in the ship, and took away the goods; and whether
the defendant was guilty was the question, viz. whether
the master or owner of the ship should answer these goods;
and resolved for the plaintiff.
Virtue v. Birde, 2 Lev. 196 (29 Car. II). Case that
whereas the defendant had hired him to carry a load of
timber from Woodbridge to Ipswich to be laid there at any
place the defendant should appoint, and that he gave notice
to the defendant that he would carry it such a day, and requested the defendant at Woodbridge to appoint where it
should be laid, and that accordingly he carried it to Ipswich,
and the defendant appointed no place where it should be
laid, but made the horses of the plaintiff being hot stay so
long in the cart, that they took cold, whereby some of them
died, and the rest were spoiled; and after verdict for the
plaintiff, upon non culp. judgment was staid, because the
action lies not; for, first, he might have taken his horses out
of his cart, and have walked them up and down, or put them
into the stable. 2. As soon as he came there, and found no
place appointed by the defendant, he might have unladen the
timber in any convenient place, and returned; and therefore
the injury which the horses received is owing to himself, and
through his own .default..
Boson v. Sandford and Others, 3 Lev. 258 (I William
and Mary). Case against the defendants proprietors of a
ship, wherein goods are usually transported for hire; and
that the plaintiff loaded goods on board the said ship to be
carried for hire from London to Topsham in Devonshire;
and that the defendants received them and undertook to
carry them to Topsham, but that they not being careful
therein, but neglecting their duty,. did so carelessly place and
carry the goods, that though the ship arrived safely at Topsham, yet the goods were spoiled: and on not guilty the jury
found a special verdict, viz. that ten other persons besides
the defendants are proprietors and part-owners of the ship;
that the ship had a master placed in her by the part-owners,
who had 6o 1. wages for every voyage between Topsham
and London; that the goods were delivered to the master,
none of the part-owners being present, and that no contract
was made with them or any for the plaintiff, that the ship
should arrive safe at Topsham, but that the goods were
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spoiled by negligence, &c. And if for the plaintiff, for the
plaintiff; and if not, for the defendant. And two questions
were made in this case. i. Whether the proprietors are
chargeable, no contract being made with them, for that
here was a master who was chargeable in respect of his
wages, as in the case of Mors and Shie, lately adjudged in
this Court. And as to this point Holt (now Ch. Just.) held
clearly, that though the master be chargeable in respect of
his wages, so are the proprietors also (in respect of the freight,
which they received for the carriage of the goods) at the
plaintiff's election. 2. Whether the action lay against the
defendants only, it appearing there are other part-owners,
who are not made defendants: and he held, that the action
did not lie, except it were brought against all the part-owners;
for they are all chargeable in respect of their (joint) profit
made by the carriage, and that in point of contract upon
their (joint) undertaking, be it either expressed or implied:
and they are not chargeableas trespassors,for then one of them
might be charged alone, but in point of contract upon their
receipt of the goods to be carriedfor hire, and so has the plaintiff
laid it in his declaration,viz. that they undertook to carry them,
&c. (See the considered judgment in this case in Shower.
29.)

Horton v. Coggs, 3 Lev. 295 (2 William and Mary).
London, to wit.-John Coggs, late of London, goldsmith, was
attached to answer Edward Horton of a plea of trespassupon
the case, &c. The plaintiff declares of a custom in London,
that if any merchant, or other person merchandizing in
London, makes a note in writing under his hand, and thereby promises to pay any sum of money therein mentioned to
the person therein named, or to the bearer; and if the person
named in the note, to whom by the note it is promised to be
paid, shall assign or deliver it to another person to-receiveit to his own use, and he carries it to the drawer of the note,
and requests him to pay it to him that brings it, that then
the person who makes the note is chargeable to pay it to the
bearer; and that the defendant being a goldsmith made such
a note, thereby promising to pay 55 1. to William Barlow,
or the bearer: and that Barlow delivered the note to the
plaintiff to receive the money to his own use, in satisfaction
of the said 55 1. due to him by Barlow, and that the plaintiff
carried and shewed it to the defendant, whereby the defendant, according to the custom aforesaid, became liable
and was liable to the payment of the said 55 1. upon the
said note to the plaintiff; and so being liable the defendant
afterwards, in consideration of the premises, upon himself
assumed and to the plaintiff then and there faithfully promised that he the defendant the said 55 1. to the plaintiff
would well and faithfully pay and content ......
Never-
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theless the defendant, his promises and assumptions aforesaid not regarding, but contriving and fraudulently intending
the plaintiff in this behalf craftily and subtilly to deceive and'
hath not paid &c. And the
defraud, the said 55 1. . .
defendant comes and defends the force and injury when &c.
and saith that he did not assume upon himself in the manner
and form as the plaintiff above complains of him &c. After
a verdict for the plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgment,
that this custom to pay to the bearer was too general; for
perhaps the goldsmith before notice by the bearer had paid
it to Barlow himself. And of that opinion after divers motions were Pollexfen, Powell and Rokesby, (Ventris dying
in the last vacation;) though upon the trial of the cause
before Pollexfen at the Guild-Hall he then held, that the
action well lay, this matter having been objected at the
said trial. Levinz of counsel for the plaintiffis
Panton v. Isham, 3 Lev. 359 (5 William and Mary).
Case, and declares on the custom of the realm, that every
one ought to keep their fire so, that by default thereof no
damage should happen to another, and that the defendant
so negligentiy kept his fire, that six stables, six hay-lofts,
and three lodging rooms of the plaintiff were thereby burnt.
The defendant pleads not guilty, and on a special verdict it
was found, that the plaintiff was seised of the stables, etc.,
and demised one of the stables to the defendant for a week
for 8 s. and so from week to week at 8 s. per week, as long
as both parties should please, and demised the other five
stables to divers other persons for divers terms yet to come,
whereby they were possessed; and being so possessed, the
fire, by the defendant's negligence, six weeks afterward begun
in the stable demised to the defendant, and burnt the same
and all the other stables, &c. And if for the plaintiff, for the
plaintiff, &c. Damages IOO 1. and tax the damages severally,
viz. 15 1. for the stable demised to the defendant, and
85 1. for the others, and costs 20 s. And upon several arguments last term and this term, judgment was given for the
plaintiff for the 85 1. and for the defendant for the 15 1. . .
2dly, That for the stable demised to the defendant himself,
no action lay; for the demise to him could be no more than
a term for three weeks, and for the residue he was tenant at
will, against whom no action lay for negligent waste, as 5
Co. 14, The Countess of Shrewsbury's case. But 3dly, As to
the stables demised to the other, the action well lies, as if
they were the stables of strangers, and not of the lessor; for
8 In consequence of this decision and subsequent decisions of Lord Holt'
refusing to recognize promissory notes as negotiable (see Clerk v. Martin, 2 Ld.
Raym. 757) a statute was passed (3 & 4 Anne, c. 9) which placed promissory

notes on the same footing in this respect as bills of exchange.

372

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

as to them there is no privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant. . . . 4thly, Although the other stables, &c.
were in lease to others, who may have anaction as to the possession for their losses, yet the lessor may also have an action for damages to his inheritance, as was formerly adjudged
in this Court in the case of Beddingfield against Onslow, 3
Lev. 209.
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (2 Anne).9 In an
action upon the case the plaintiff declared quod cum Bernard
the defendant, the Ioth of November 13 Will. 3, &c., assumpsisset, salvo et secure elevare, Anglice, to take up certain
hogsheads of brandy then in a certain cellar in D. et salvo
et secure deponere, Anglice to lay them down again in a certain other cellar in Water-Lane, the said defendant and his
servants and agents, tam negligenter et improvide put them
down again into the said other cellar, quod per defectum
Curae ipsius the defendant, his servants and agents, one of
the casks was staved, and a great quantity of brandy was
spilt. After not guilty pleaded, and a verdict for the plaintiff, there was a motion in arrest of judgment, for that it
was not alledged in the declaration that the defendant was
a common porter, nor averred that he had any thing for
his pains. . . Gould, Justice. . . The reason of the
action is, the particulartrust reposed in the defendant, to which
he has concurred by his assumption, and in the executing
which he has miscarried by his neglect. . . .
. Powell, J...
Now to give the reason of these cases, the gist of these actions is the undertaking. The party's special assumpsit
and undertaking oblige him so to do the thing, that the
bailor come to no damage by his neglect. Holt, Chief
Justice. . . . There has been a motion in arrest of judgment, that the declaration is insufficient because the defendant is neither laid to be a common porter, nor that he is
to have any reward for his labour. So that the defendant
is not chargeable by his trade, and a private person cannot
be charged in an action without a reward.
I have had a great consideration of this case, and because some of the books make the action lie upon the reward, and some upon the promise, at first I made a great
question, whether this declaration was good. But upon
consideration, as this declaration is, I think the action will
well lie. . . . (He then delivers his famous disquisition
on bailments.) The reasons are, first, because in such a
case, a neglect is a deceipt to the bailor. For when he instructs the bailee upon his undertaking to be careful, he
9 This case is inserted, although it is in date just outside the period that we
are dealiig with, because it so exactly raises the difficulty of the distinction between contract and tort dealt with below.
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has put a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent, his
pretence of care being the persuasion that induced the plaintiff
to trust him. And a breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily will be a good ground for an action. i Roll. Abr. IO
....
There the case was an action against a man, who
had undertaken to keep an hundred sheep, for letting them
be drown'd by his default. And there the reason of the
judgment is given, because when the party has taken upon
him to keep the sheep, and after suffers them to perish in his
default; in as much as he has taken and executed his bargain,
and has them in his custody, if after he does not look to
them, an action lies. For here is his own act, viz. his
agreement and promise, and that after broke of his side,
that shall give a sufficient cause of action.
But secondly it is objected, that there is no consideration to ground this promise upon, and therefore the undertaking is but nudum pactum. But to this I answer, that
the owner's trusting him with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management. Indeed if the
agreement had been executory, to carry these brandies from
the one place to the other such a day, the defendant had
not been bound to carry them. But this is a different case,
for assumpsit does not only signify a future agreement, but
in such a case as this, it signifies an actual entry upon the
thing, and taking the trust upon himself. And if a man will
do that, and miscarries in the performance of his trust, an
action will lie against him for that, though nobody could
have compelled him to do the thing .......
This series of cases is very instructive, possibly rather humiliating to English lawyers. The inheritors of the English Common
Law are apt to boast that it is really much more scientific than the
Roman Law-that the latter does not even recognize the distinction between contract and tort. These cases show how nebulous
the English distinction really is, and how illogical. A tort has been
well defined as, theoretically, "a breach of duty (other than a contractual or quasi-contractual duty) creating an obligation, and giving
rise to an action for damages." 10 According to this definition,
there is only one of these cases which is really an action for tort,
viz., Panton v. Isham. The others are all actions for breach of
'0 A Digest of English Civil Law, edited by Edward Jenks, Book ii, Part iii,
by J. C. Miles, p. 326.
"Quasi-contractual" is here used, substantially, for the class of cases where
an action on the money counts would have been available under the old system
of pleading. It will be seen infra that, though this definition is theoretically
correct, it does not accurately state the English law.
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contract, because bailment is clearly a contract. Nevertheless,
all these cases, with the exception of Horton v. Coggs, would be
regarded in English law as actions of tort because the right plea
for the defendant was "not guilty" insteady of "non assumpsit."
This is a good illustration of Maine's sage and oft-quoted
maxim that "substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure. "I The action of assumpsit should, naturally, have been developed either from the old
action of covenant or the old action of debt. It is quite easy to
understand why it was not affiliated to debt, because in most actions of debt the defendant could wage his law. In covenant the
defendant could not wage his law, but there were probably technical rules about the production of the document sued upon which
rendered it inapplicable to an oral agreement. However this may
be, in fact the action of assumpsit was developed from the action
of trespass, through the medium of the action of trespass on the
case. There is a good example of this in the pleadings in the case
of Horton v. Coggs, supra. The defendant is "attached to answer
Edward Horton of a plea of trespasson the case." Then the declaration goes on to allege a cause of action in assumpsit, and the plea is
non assumpsit. Per contra, in Coggs v. Bernard, supra, the declaration is apparently in assumpsit, and it is so treated by all the
Judges in the case, yet the plea is not guilty; and for that reason,
in the comparatively modern case of Corbett v. Packington2 it was
held to have been an action in tort and not in assumpsit, the action
of assumpsit having by this time come to be regarded as an action
of contract, as opposed to an ordinary action of trespass on the case
which was regarded as an action in tort.
There is no doubt that, because of their lineage, originally all
actions which were nominally actions of trespass on the case were
regarded as actions of tort, whether they arose from a breach of
duty which was independent of contiact, or whether the act complained of was a wrong only because it was a breach of contract.
The next step was to draw a distinction between the cases of persons
who followed a public calling such as common carriers or innkeepers,
and the rest of the world, and to say that, if a man were sued, upon
n Maine, Early Law and Custom, p. 389.
(1827) 6 B. & C. 268, at p. 272.
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the custom of the realm, for the breach of a duty which he owed to
all persons alike who dealt with him, and who were entitled to
command his services, that was an action in tort; but that if he
were merely a private person who was guilty of the breach of a particular engagement, then the action against him was in contract.
This distinction is continually referred to in the cases above set
out. It seems to me to have been practically disposed of by the
cases of Boson v. Sandford and Coggs v. Bernard, supra. In the

first of these cases the action was against the defendants as common carriers and the plea was not guilty. Nevertheless, it was held
that it was an action for breach of contract, and that therefore some
of the co-owners could not be sued without joining the others.
In Coggs v. Bernard it was not alleged that the defendant was a
-common carrier, and that point was taken as one of the grounds
for arresting judgment, but, nevertheless, it was held that the
defendant was liable.
The ultimate rule adopted by the English Courts is thus stated
.by a very eminent Judge:
"The distinction between tort and contract is not a
logical one, and it is sometimes difficult to say whether a
particular thing is a wrong or a breach of contract. If
the claim of the plaintiff is set out at large, pointing to some
particular stipulation in the contract which has been broken,
the action would be founded. on contract; but where it is
only necessary to refer to the contract to establish a relationship between the parties, and the claim goes on to aver
a breach of duty arising out of that relationship, the action
is one of tort."'"
One may heartily agree with the learned Judge that the distinction is illogical. The breach of duty arises equally out of contract whether it is a breach of a duty imposed by the Common Law
upon the parties to all contracts of a certain class, or whether it is a
.breach of a particular duty imposed upon the particular parties by
the particular contract. The only logical distinction would seem
to be between a breach of a duty which arises independently of
contract altogether, and a breach of a duty which arises only because of a particular antecedent contract. The existing confusion
Per Collins, L. J., in Sacks v. Henderson, 1902, I K. B. D., p. 616.
.also per the same Judge in Turner v. Stallibrass,1898, I Q. B. 56.
13
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is really the result entirely of the curious development of legal
procedure in this country; and, to my mind, can only be understood
by reference to such a group of cases as those collected above.
The net result is that in England the same transaction may give
rise both to a right of action in tort and to one in contract. 4
6. Actions of Assumpsit shewing the Development of the Doctrine of Consideration.
Traverse v. Meres, Sir T. R. 32 (i Car. II). The plaintiff declares, that whereas the husband of the defendant now
dead, was indebted to the plaintiff, the defendant promised,
that if the plaintiff would manifest and make appear that
her said husband was indebted, she would pay it; and avers,
that he had been at all times ready to manifest the said debt;
and on non assumpsit found for the plaintiff. And Allen
moved in arrest of judgment, that there is not any consideration, for that the wife was neither executrix nor administratrix. Trin. 51, Rot. I446, Hunce versus Hinton. The son
of the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff, and the defendant promised upon forbearance to pay; and there judg-ment was for the plaintiff, because forbearance shall be taken
for total forbearance ........
Twisden, Justice. The
difference is betwixt forbearance generally, there is a good
ground of action, although the defendant be neither executor
nor administrator; but upon forbearance of the defendant
it ought to appear that there was some cause of forbearance.
Wild for the plaintiff. The making of the debt appear, is
trouble and pains to the plaintiff, and therefore a good consideration. It was adjourned, and afterwards judgment
was given for the plaintiff.
Benson v. French, i Lev. 98 (15 Car. II). Assumpsit
and declares, that he had arrested a woman for 20 1. and that
she being in the custody of the bailiff at the defendant's
house, the defendant in consideration that the bailiff would
permit the woman to tariry at the defendant's house for one
night, promised to the bailiff on the plaintiff's part, to deliver the woman to the bailiff the next morning, or to pay.
the 20 1. And that the bailiff permitted the woman to
tarry there that night; but that the defendant did not deliver
her to the bailiff the next morning, nor had he paid the 20 1.
After verdict on non assumpsit for the plaintiff, it was moved
in arrest of judgment by Wylde the King's Serjeant, that
the .woman was either always in the custody of the bailiff,
(and then it was not any consideration) or out of his custody,
and then it was an escape, and the consideration and pro14 See Meux v. The G. E. Ry. Co., (1895) 2 Q. B. 387.
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mise were (then) both illegal. To which it was answered
by Jones, that it might be for the ease of the woman to lie
there that night, and so a good consideration, though never
out of the custody of the bailiff; and if it be intended that she
was out of the bailiff's custody, yet it shall be intended that
it was by the plaintiff's assent, because the promise was made
to the bailiff on the plaintiff's part; and the plaintiff having
brought the action it proves his assent, and his assent after
is sufficient to make the promise good. And held by the
Court, if it was an escape, the consideration and promise
were both illegal; but they held that it was not any escape,
but rather an undertaking that she should not escape; and
the promise being laid to be made to the bailiff on the
plaintiff's part, it shall be intended that she was left there
by the assent of the plaintiff. And they gave judgment
for the plaintiff .......
Quick v. Coppleton, i Lev. 16i (I7 Car. II). Assumpstt.
Whereas the defendant's late husband was indebted to the
plaintiff, and she about to come to London, and being in
fear to be arrested by the plaintiff, she promised him in
consideration that he would not trouble her, and would
forbear till Michaelmas, to pay, &c. After verdict, it was
moved, that she not being shewn to be executor or administrator, the forbearance was not any consideration, which
was agreed by the Court; but the subsequent words forbear till Michaelmas, are distinct and general, not only to
forbear her but all others, and makes a good consideration,
whether she be liable or not; and they cited Heriot and
Hinton's case adjudged, that a general forbearance is a good
* consideration, whether the party promising be liable or
not. . . . And Hyde Chief Justice held, that a forbearance to sue one who fears to be sued, is a good consideration;
and he cited a case in the Common Pleas, when he sate there
where a woman who feared that the dead body of her son
would be arrested for debt, promised in consideration of
forbearance, to pay; and it was adjudged against her,
though she was neither executor nor administrator. But
of this the other Judges doubted.
Harvy v. Gibbons, 2 Lev. 161 (27 & 28 Car. II). Error
of a judgment in Shrewsbury Court, where the plaintiff declared, that he being bailiff to J. S. the defendant in consideration that he would discharge him of 20 1. due to J. S. promised to expend 40 1. in repairing a barge of the plaintiff's;
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, upon non assumpsit
was reversed, the consideration being illegal, for the plaintiff cannot discharge a debt due to his master.
Tripps v. Rand, 2 Lev. 198 (29 Car. II). Assumpsit
in consideration the plaintiff at the defendant's request would
procure himself to be made a knight at his own proper
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charges, so that his wife, the defendant's daughter, might
be a lady, to pay him 2000 1. and says, that he procured
himself to be knighted at his own charges, whereby his wife
became a lady; yet the defendant had not paid him. After
verdict and judgment upon non assumpsit in Com. Banc.
it was now assigned for error in B. R. that it is not said the
plaintiff procured himself to be knighted at the request of
the defendant: it might be he did it of his own head, and the
request here is part of the consideration, executory and
traversable, and by omitting it the plaintiff (defendant?)
hath lost his traverse of the request; and upon non assumpsit
he was not obliged here to prove a request upon evidence,
as are the cases in Hob. 88, Io6, and for authority in point,
2 Leon. 53. 3 Leon. 91. Curia contra, The request shall
be intended here to be made at the time of the promise;
scil. that he then requested him to be made a knight, and
promised to give him 2000 1. and it shall not be intended
that he promised to give him the 2000 1. if he would procure
himself to be made a knight when he should afterwards
request him, and so the request is not executory, but executed at the time of the promise made: and they gave rule
to affirm the judgment; but at the earnest motion of Jones
Attorney-General, to be farther heard for the plaintiff in
error, it was adjourned until next term, when the judgment
was affirmed by the whole Court.
Dutton and Wife v. Poole, 2 Lev. 210 (29 Car. II).
Assumpsit, and declares, that the father of the plaintiff's
wife being seised of a wood which he intended to sell to raise
portions for younger children, the defendant being his heir,
in consideration the father would forbear to sell it at his
request, promised the father to pay his daughter, now the
plaintiff's wife, 1ooo 1. and avers, that the father at his
request forbore, but the defendant had not paid the iooo I.
After verdict for the plaintiff upon non assumpsit, it was
moved in arrest of judgment, that the action ought not to
be brought by the daughter, but by the father; or if the
father be dead, by his executors; for the promise was made
to the father, and the daughter is neither privy nor interested in the consideration, nothing being due to her: also
the father, notwithstanding this agreement with the son,
might have cut down the wood, and then there was no remedy
for the son, nor could the daughter have released the promise,
-and therefore she cannot have an action against him for
not performing the promise, and divers cases were cited
for the defendant, as Yelv. Rippon v. Norton, Hawes v.
Leader, Starky v. Milner, i Roll. 31, 32, Sty. 296, and a
case lately resolved in Com. Banc. inter Norris & Pine,
intrat. Hill, 22 & 23 Car. II, 1538, where the case was;
If you will marry me, I will pay your children so much; and
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the action being brought by the children, adjudged it lay
not. On the other side it was said, if a man delivers goods
or money to H. to deliver on pay to B., B. may have an action,
because he is to have the benefit of the bailment; so here the
daughter is to have the benefit of the promise: so if a man
should say, Give me a horse, I will give your son io 1. the
son may bring action, because the gift was upon consideration of a profit to the son; and the father is obliged by natural
affection to provide for his children; for which cause affection to children is sufficient to raise a use to them out of the
father's estate; and therefore the daughter had an interest
in the consideration; and in the promise; and the son had a
benefit by this agreement, for by this means he hath the
wood, and the daughter is without a portion, which otherwise
in all probability the son would have been left to pay, if
the wood had not been cut down, nor this agreement between him and his father, and for authorities of this side were
cited, Roll. i Ab. 3, Oldman v. Bateman, and ibid. 32,
Starky v. Meade. Upon the first argument Wylde and
Jones Justices seemed to think, that the action ought to be
brought by the father and his executors, though for the
benefit of the daughter, and not by the daughter, being not
privy to the promise, nor consideration. Twysden and
Rainsford seemed contra; and afterwards two new Judges
being made, scil. Scroggs Chief Justice in lieu of Rainsford,
and Dolbin in lieu of Twysden, the case was argued again
upon the reasons aforesaid; and now Scroggs Ch. Just.
said, that there was such apparent consideration of affection
from the father to his children, for whom nature obliges him
to provide, that the consideration and promise to the father
may well extend to the children: and he and Jones remembered
the case of Norris & Pine;and that it was adjudged as aforesaid. But Scroggs said, he was then and still is of opinion
contrary to that judgment. Dolben, Justice, concurred
with him that the daughter might bring the action; Jones
and Wylde haesitabant. But next day they also agreed to
the opinion of the Chief Justice and Dolben; and so judgment
was given for the plaintiff, for the son hath benefit by having
of the wood, and the daughter hath lost her portion by this
means. And now Jones said, he must confess he was never
well satisfied with the judgment in Norris & Pine's case;
but being it was resolved, he was loth to give his opinion
so suddenly against it. And nota, upon this judgment error
was immediately brought; and Trin. 31 Car. II, it was affirmed in the Exchequer-Chamber. 5
'See Sir T. R. 302.
Notwithstanding that this is a decision of the Exchequer Chamber it is
clearly no longer law in England. See per Wightman, Crompton and Blackburn, J. J., in Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) i B. & S. 393. The modern rule is
that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although
.made for his benefit.
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It may perhaps be worth while to append to these cases for
purposes of comparison the definition of "valuable consideration"
given in the Exchequer Chamber in Currie v. Misa, (1875) 44 L. J.
Ex. 94-the modern "locus classicus" on the subject:
"A valuable consideration, in the gense of the law,
may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the
other."
There are other matters which might be dwelt upon in the
cases during the period under discussion-such as the relative
fields of the actions of debt and assumpsit and the like-but they
are, as a rule, of too technical a character to be of much profit to a
modern lawyer. I must say, in conclusion, that I am most grateful to my historical friend for suggesting to me this task. I have
found it very interesting. The period in question is probably not
of so great interest to an historian as the earlier periods dealt with
by such students as Maitland, Pollock and Holdsworth in this
country. To a lawyer, however, it is of quite equal interest; as it
is a time when legal ideas are beginning to emancipate themselves
from legal forms, and, under the influence of such great intellects
as Chief Justices Holt and Hale, are beginning to assume definite
and logical form. Anyone who reads the cases set forth above, will
I think, be struck with the modern way in which the legal questions
are handled. I do not apologize for setting the cases out at length.
I am more convinced every day that no one can really understand
the English Common Law until he knows something about the
English forms of action and their history, and that the first thing
to be done in reading an old case is to find out exactly what the
form of action is, and why that form was adopted.
Francis R. Y. Radcliffe.
London, February, 1QT3.

